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ABSTRACT: The management of Information Technology (IT) and Information Sys-
tems (IS) is considered a complex exercise by academics and practitioners alike. The
reason for this is that there are ubiquitous portfolios of tangible and intangible ben-
efits that are offered to an organization following the adoption of IT/IS that, in turn,
all need managing to ensure realization. Organizations also have to take into account
the direct and often larger indirect costs that are typically associated with IT/IS de-
ployments. To provide managers with a critical insight into the management of new
technology, this paper uses a case study research strategy to examine the technology
management experiences of a leading U.K. manufacturing organization during its
adoption of a vendor-supplied Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRPII) informa-
tion system. Following the lack of attention given to human and organizational tech-
nology management factors while implementing MRPII, the vendor-based information
system was later abandoned and deemed a failure. In addressing those technology
management factors that were later identified as important, it was found that key
employees were able to overcome a number of organizational barriers and develop
and implement a bespoke MRPII system that significantly improved the organization’s
competitive position. Technology management taxonomies that contributed to the
failure and later successful implementation of MRPII are identified and discussed.
The organization’s experiences in solving the problems associated with the imple-
mentation of their IS offers a learning opportunity for those companies that are seek-
ing a competitive advantage through technology management.
KEY WORDS AND PHRASES: benefits, costs, evaluation, investment, MRPII, taxono-
mies, technology management.
THE ADOPTION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) and Information Systems (IS)
remains a lengthy, time-consuming and complex process, so issues associated with
its management would appear to be of paramount importance. Yet many companies
appear to approach the whole management of technology in an unstructured or ad
hoc manner throughout the systems’ lifecycle. However, with capital investments in
IT/IS such as Material Requirements Planning (MRPII), or its enhanced extension
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) predicted to increase from $21.02 billion in 1998
to $72.63 billion in 2001, issues associated with technology management are appear-
ing on management’s agenda [11].
The effective management of technology needs to be viewed as a structured itera-
tive business process, which offers organizational learning during the lifecycle of
the technology. This feedback is necessary so as to offer businesses the opportunity
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to learn from their experiences, or mistakes. Technology management should be
seen as a business process that facilitates the development of a comprehensive and
robust technocentric infrastructure, consequently enhancing the delivery of accu-
rate, timely, and appropriate services within an organization, which in turn increases
the economic vitality of the business. There remains, however, a so called “technol-
ogy management gap” within many businesses, which may result in a competitive
advantage being jeopardized. Remenyi et al. [18] propose that technology manage-
ment (when viewed from an evaluation perspective) may not be deployed in an ef-
fective manner in many businesses, and thus initiators of the new technology often
become distanced from the development process. In addition, developers may lose
sight of the business focus and as a result not deliver what was originally proposed
and justified. Similarly, Irani et al. [14] suggest that technology management policies
and procedures based on the use of traditional appraisal techniques have worked well
for decisions concerning manufacturing capital equipment replacement, but are myo-
pic for the appraisal of complex IT/IS such as MRPII or ERP. The reason for this is
that the human and organizational implications associated with adopting new tech-
nology (and its management) are often overlooked, or simply ignored. Yet such fac-
tors can significantly impact the success or failure of IT/IS investments [5, 6, 13, 17,
20, 22].
Clearly, efficient and effective technology management has the scope to impact com-
panies in a positive or negative way during the technology’s lifecycle (i.e., feasibility,
justification, requirements definition/engineering, system design, details design, test
and preoperation, implementation, operation, maintenance, and post-implementation
audit/evaluation). Furthermore, the multiple paths associated with technology man-
agement can often yield considerably different outcomes.
This paper uses a case study to describe the experiences of a leading UK manufac-
turing organization that managed its technology through what were internally con-
sidered traditional approaches, that is, basing its investment justification for
implementing a MRPII system around traditional appraisal processes. Such prescrip-
tive methods, however, were unable to capture and accommodate the human and
organizational dimensions of the investment, and as a result the vendor system was
later abandoned and deemed a failure. Recognizing the need for an integrated IS that
captures the idiosyncrasies of the organization and softer implications of the invest-
ment, key employees were able to later overcome human and organizational barriers
and approach the adoption and management of MRPII from a new perspective. Tech-
nology management (human and organizational) taxonomies that contributed to the
successful evaluation and implementation of a MRPII system are identified and dis-
cussed by the authors. In doing so, this paper makes a contribution to the normative
literature by describing how different approaches to the technology management
process can yield different organizational outcomes. Two fundamentally different
approaches of technology management are presented and discussed. As a result, the
findings presented in the paper provide a learning opportunity for those companies
that are seeking a competitive advantage through the effective management of new
technology.
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Research Methodology
PREVIOUS RESEARCH SUGGESTS THAT AN ORGANIZATION’S FAILURE with IT/IS is pri-
marily attributable to not meeting user expectations, which underlines the signifi-
cance of the soft human and organizational issues involved with IT/IS evaluation
[19]. With this in mind, there was a need for a research methodology that would
involve and enfranchise an organization and their staff, so that the theory and knowl-
edge surrounding decision-making and the investment justification process of MRPII
could be derived to develop effective technology management taxonomies. Consider-
ing the originality of this research, a case study strategy was adopted [8, 9, 23]. The
case used for the research was not systematically sampled, so it is not possible to
generalize the findings to a wider population of small to medium enterprises (SMEs)
with similar characteristics found within the manufacturing industry.
Data Collection
The data collection procedure has followed the major prescriptions in doing field-
work research [1, 4, 7, 23]. A variety of secondary data sources were used to collect
data with regard to the development of technology management taxonomies for evalu-
ating MRPII investments, such as internal reports, budget reports, and filed accounts.
A variety of data have been used to derive the findings presented in this paper, which
include interviews, observations, illustrative materials (e.g., newsletters and other
publications that form part of the case study organization’s history) and past project
management documentation. The authors have extensive industrial experience in the
manufacturing industry and have used this experience, together with a predefined
interview protocol, to determine the data needed for the research.
Interviews
Interviews were conducted with the Managing Director (MD), Production Director
(PD), Production Manager (PM), and Shop Floor employees. The duration of each
interview was approximately 40 minutes, where every interview was conducted on a
“one-to-one” basis so as to stimulate conversation and break down any barriers that
may have existed between the interviewer and interviewee. Furthermore, all inter-
views took place away from the normal office environment and resulting disruptions.
(Interviews were conducted in the company’s boardroom.)
The authors acted as a neutral medium through which questions and answers were
transmitted and therefore endeavored to eliminate bias. Essentially, bias in interviews
occurs when the interviewer tries to adjust the wording of the question to fit the re-
spondent or records only selected portions of the respondent’s answers. Most often,
however, interviewer bias results from the use of probes. These are follow-up ques-
tions and are typically used by interviewers to get respondents to elaborate on am-
biguous or incomplete answers [21]. Bearing this in mind, in trying to clarify the
respondent’s answers the interviewers were careful not to introduce any ideas that
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might form part of the respondent’s subsequent answer. Furthermore, the interview-
ers were also mindful of the feedback respondents gained from their verbal and non-
verbal responses. Thus the interviewer avoided giving overt signals such as smiling
and nodding approvingly when a respondent failed to answer a question. It was de-
cided that such actions could lead to respondents withholding responses to later ques-
tions. The interviewees reviewed the reports from the interviews and their views were
invited to ensure the accuracy of the reports.
Case Study Validity
The use of interviews, documentary sources, and observations indicates that internal
validity needed to be addressed. Interviews, in particular, were used to identify tech-
nology management “failure” and “success” factors related to MRPII implementa-
tion, which had been discovered through examining the interviews.  Each interview
was tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed. These were given to each person
that had been interviewed to check and to resolve any discrepancies that may have
arisen and eliminate any interviewer bias. Bearing in mind the array of evidence that
was accumulated, great care was undertaken by the authors to ensure that the data
collected converged on similar facts [15].
Case Study
THE CASE STUDY PRESENTED IN THIS SECTION describes the experiences of a SME
UK manufacturing organization that adopted a vendor-based MRPII system, which
subsequently “failed” to satisfy user requirements. The reason for this failure is at-
tributed to a lack of consideration of human and organizational benefits and costs
implications during the evaluation process [19]. Acknowledging the problems with
the system, functional managers later developed and implemented a bespoke MRPII
system, which took into account financial, human, and organizational cost and ben-
efits. As a result, the system has proven to be very successful, as the organization was
cited in the UK’s top 100 for its best practices.
Background
The case study organization (which shall be referred to as Company V) is a precision
subcontract job shop with about 150 employees and a turnover of just under £5 mil-
lion.  It produces a wide variety of made-to-order parts, products, and assemblies, for
a large number of customers, in diverse industries. Essentially, Company V sells time
and expertise using many different conventional and computer-controlled machines.
Company V has a make-to-order inventory policy, with most component parts having
a very low level of standardization and thus few common components. To produce
these differing and often complex parts, a highly flexible production capability is
required. This implies versatile manufacturing equipment, flexible employees, and a
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genuine need to maximize the utilization of technology, to continuously improve and
innovate, and to remain competitive in manufacture. Typical components and assem-
blies within a jobbing shop environment tend to be diverse and have uncomplicated
Bills of Material (BOM) and product structures. Furthermore, they are nearly always
made to specifications supplied by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).
Orders for individual products tend to be small and their timing depends on the
fluctuating needs of customers, who often use the company to “off-load” capacity.
Therefore, close communications and the integrity of information between Com-
pany V and its customers are necessary for responsive change. The company boasts
of its agility and information management, and as such manufacturing lead times are
short, which ensures that throughput production flow is maximized. Therefore, if
there are changes in the requirements of customers or the marketplace then Com-
pany V is able to respond in an effective manner by retooling or reequipping their
production facility.
Company V’s management team is lean, with few functional divisions. The follow-
ing personnel report directly to the managing director: a sales and marketing director,
a finance director, an administrative/general director (to whom the purchasing, hu-
man resource, and IT/IS functions report), and a manufacturing director. On the shop
floor, supervisors manage several self-directed work teams who comprise of 7 to 15
staff members, such as machine operators, assemblers, material handlers, receivers,
and shippers.
Case Findings and Analysis
THE “SUCCESS” OF COMPANY V’S PREVIOUS INVESTMENTS helped give them the en-
couragement and motivation they needed to introduce a computerized Production
Planning and Control (PPC) system. The measure of “success” used by Company V
was the removal of “procedural pain”—that is, if it was not considered painful to
carry out the new computerized procedure, the project was considered a success.
When asked to further elaborate on the issue of procedural pain, the measures of
laborious, repetitive, boring, and time-consuming were all identified. However, it
should be noted that these are all nontraditional “subjective” intangible and nonfinan-
cial measures, but according to Hyde [12], traditional criteria for judging IT project
success are no longer correct and should be replaced by measures that reflect new
approaches to system development and management.
Unlike other “smaller” investments, the driving force behind the PPC project was
the managing director, who ultimately sanctioned all investment decisions. When
asked to evaluate the perceived impact of the proposed PPC system, the managing
director replied:
The scope of benefits from investing in IT appeared enormous, and only re-
stricted by my imagination. . . . I was the main visionary leader and could see
the long-term strategic implications of my decision to invest. I was sure the
benefits would far outweigh the costs.
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There appeared, however, to be other factors “driving” this investment, with the
managing director stating:
We were under significant pressure by our customers to offer year on year cost
reductions. . . . So, there were risks associated with not utilizing new technol-
ogy to provide a competitive advantage.
The reason why Company V lacked a formal justification process was because they
had not previously invested in projects that were outside the scope of traditional ap-
praisal techniques. In particular, major strategic benefits such as perceived market
leadership, leadership in new technology, and promotion of an “open business cul-
ture” were not readily convertible in financial terms. Previous investments in Com-
puter Numerically Controlled (CNC) equipment had been financed through loan
agreements where cash flow projections and sensitivity analysis had been used to
assess the impact and risk of the investment. Clearly, in such cases the focus is on
direct financial benefits and costs, whereas the PPC system was viewed as providing
a portfolio of benefits and costs, which were not easily accommodated within those
appraisal techniques traditionally used by Company V.
Company V soon discovered that the accountancy frameworks that it has consider-
able experience in using were not suitable for investments with intangible and nonfi-
nancial benefits and indirect costs, as they provided inappropriate information for
rigorous evaluation. A new and inexperienced management team (which was un-
aware of the latest appraisal techniques, which could take into account qualitative
costs and benefits) used a simplistic Cost/Benefit Analysis (CBA). Management’s use
of CBA allowed the listing of perceived project benefits and costs, but no assign-
ments of financial values were made to the PPC implications identified. This was due
to the complexity, subjectivity, and time-consuming nature of identifying and assign-
ing arbitrary values to the intangible and nonfinancial benefits and costs associated
with the PPC investment. Table 1 presents a taxonomy of strategic benefits identified
as part of Company V’s CBA, with Tables 2 and 3 presenting tactical and operational
benefits, respectively. The interdependent nature of these taxonomies is also depicted
in Figure 1.
In considering the proposed taxonomies of benefits identified in the tables, Harris
[10] describes how investment decisions typically fall into three categories, these
being strategic, tactical, and operational. Regarding the costs considered as part of
Company V’s CBA, they only identified direct financial costs, such as:
• uninterruptable power supply
• file servers, terminals, and printing facilities
• backup tape streamer
• key vendor software modules
• relational database software
• additional networking software
• consultancy support (partially grant funded)
• network wiring, junctions, and connectors
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• installation and maintenance
• “in-house” customizing time
• reengineering of business processes to suit software
• running costs: electricity insurance premium rises
• consumables (e.g., toner cartridges disks, paper)
• database software course
• database user group fees
• hardware and software performance required to process types
• data volumes of transactions
• functions that are over and above a given user’s immediate requirement (e.g.,
mandatory security facilities)
• balancing developmental costs against maintenance costs
• network architecture and associated hubs, routers, and gateways
Table 1. Taxonomy of Strategic Production Planning and Control Benefits
Non- Partly/Totally
Classification of MRPII Benefits Financial Financial Intangible
Strategic Benefits
Improved Growth and Success X X X
Leader in New Technology X
Improved Market Share X
Market Leadership X X X
Enhanced Competitive Advantage X X X
Table 2. Taxonomy of Tactical Production Planning and Control Benefits
Non- Partly/Totally
Classification of MRPII Benefits Financial Financial Intangible
Tactical Benefits
     Improved Flexibility X X X
Improved Response to Changes X
Improved Product Quality X X X
Improved Teamwork X
Promotes Open Culture X
Improved Integration with other X
   business Functions
Increased Plant Efficiency X
Reduced Delivery Lead-times X
Reduced Lead-times X
Improved Capacity Planning X X X
Improved Data Management X X
Improved Manufacturing Control X X
Improved Accuracy of Decisions X X X
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As Company V was unable to calculate accurately the financial returns achievable,
an “act of faith” decision to invest was made. The basis for this investment strategy,
although ad hoc, was that the company was unable to calculate accurately the scope
and magnitude of the investments’ benefits. In particular, the far-reaching implica-
tions of the intangible and nonfinancial benefits (together with the indirect costs that
later appeared), added to the complexity and further justified the investment strategy.
Interestingly enough, the British CIMA/IProdE [2] suggests that some benefits of IT/
IS cannot be quantified, and stated that “an act of faith that such systems are neces-
sary may be required.” Therefore, it would appear that the British CIMA/IProdE ad-
vocates the adoption of an ad hoc justification strategy. Yet Kaplan [16] states that if
companies invest in projects whose financial returns are unknown, or below their cost
of capital, there is a chance they could become insolvent.
During the implementation of the core PPC module, it became evident that the
vendor-supplied system required the data to fulfill its (the software’s) needs, rather
than fitting the way Company V operated. It is noteworthy that Cox and Clark [3]
reported similar findings. Such circumstances had sought to be avoided by Company
V, as the “major” reengineering of business processes just to satisfy the software was
considered expensive, non-value-adding, and time-consuming, as well as causing
Table 3. Taxonomy of Operational Production Planning and Control Benefits
Non- Partly/Totally
Classification of MRPII Benefits Financial Financial Intangible
Operational Benefits
Reduced Raw Material Inventory X
Reduced Levels of WIP X
Reduced Labor Costs X
Reduced Manufacturing Costs X
Increased Throughput X
 
 
Generally Intangible  
and Non-Financial  
in Nature 
 
Generally Tangible  
and Non-Financial  
in Nature 
Strategic  
Benefit 
Tactical 
Benefit 
Operational 
Benefit 
Figure 1. Nature of Strategic, Tactical, and Operational Benefits
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disruptions to production performance. Furthermore, these implications appeared as
significant cost factors that had not been acknowledged within their CBA. The
reengineering of processes, however, presented themselves as unavoidable, to achieve
the necessary functionality for the effective use of the PPC system.
Employee resistance and a culture based on reactive isolation added to the imple-
mentation problems. People openly blamed the IS when things went wrong. The pro-
duction director was regularly confronted with “work-to lists” that usually had much
data that seemed meaningless. He was ready to dismiss the system and go back to the
old manual way of PPC. However, the production director was eventually convinced
by the software selection and implementation team that computerized PPC was the
only way forward if the company were to expand in the future. The team explained
that the difficulties being experienced were attributable to the lack of a suitable re-
porting structure and data format and that the system needed time to “settle down.”
It appeared that Company V’s biggest problem was their core vendor-supplied PPC
module, which worked extremely well if kept supplied with a continuous flow of
“clean data.” Nonetheless, if there was any “hitch” in data recording or accuracy, the
system became highly unstable and unreliable. Therefore, the need to alleviate this
problem led the software selection and implementation team to investigate the pur-
chase of a vendor shop floor data collection (SFDC) module. Furthermore, the pur-
chase of the SFDC module seemed a natural progression toward achieving “full”
MRPII integration, which received the managing director’s endorsement.
It was found that the operational workforce did not receive an orientation on the
importance of PPC and on how the SFDC could make a contribution to the  perfor-
mance of the PPC function. In hindsight, however, the software selection and imple-
mentation team regretted not educating the workforce. This was particularly painful
to the team because management considered this lack of education and training as a
barrier to the program being accepted at an operational level. Skepticism and the
implications of misuse resulted in “unreliable” data, which brought “noise” into the
Master Production Schedule (MPS). Such issues later resulted in inaccurate customer
delivery lead times being quoted, falls in productivity, and the loss of a customer
base. These factors had a significant impact on the perceived success of the IS and
were not acknowledged as implementation issues during the systems evaluation.
At this point the managing director (project champion) turned his attention to a new
project, appearing to have either lost interest, due to the lack of success, or being
driven by other organizational improvement initiatives. Responsibility for the imple-
mentation process was delegated to others, hoping that the by then well-established
production director would take up the challenge. He had not been a key member of
the software selection and implementation team, but had, rather, operated as an hon-
oree, advising on technical issues when consulted. The production director therefore
expected to take the lead in his role as head of the production department. He did not
welcome the responsibility for ensuring project success of a half-implemented sys-
tem, on which he had been given little opportunity for significant input. Still, he
acknowledged the contribution that the PPC system was making (and could further
make) toward the streamlining of the production function. In light of difficulties, the
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software selection and implementation team suddenly changed, from supporting to
trying to apportion blame.
Many of the problems that the real-time shop floor data collection intended to alle-
viate appeared to be further complicated by the SFDC module, which, as the produc-
tion director claimed, was because:
We had not sat down in the first place and formalized our systems. . . . People
were not informed of the impact the system would make on their job
function(s) . . . nobody on the shop floor bought into ensuring the success of the
system. They needed educating, not disciplining.
Furthermore, it appeared that at this point, the software selection and implementa-
tion team reached a stalemate. No clear direction could be decided, as there was no
focused leadership within the team. Furthermore, the PPC software appeared to be
dictating the need for a number of dedicated experts, to analyze, manipulate, and
control the production function. This was not welcomed by the majority of the man-
agement team, who were trying to develop a corporate culture based on openness,
through promoting the concepts of flexible, empowered teamwork. Thus the adop-
tion of such a system clearly did not have the operational support necessary for its
successful operation. Consequently, management, who were supported by the soft-
ware selection and implementation team, advocated the development of a bespoke
system, more suited to the idiosyncrasies of Company V’s processes, and their by
now perceived unique needs as a subcontract jobbing shop.
The Development of a Bespoke MRPII System
DRIVEN BY THE NEED1 TO DEVELOP AN INTEGRATED IS that would acknowledge the
idiosyncrasies of Company V, key employees set about developing their own busi-
ness solution. This investment was partially financed by two government-sponsored
schemes. The development of bespoke software was perceived to give Company V a
new opportunity to gain operational support for the successful implementation of
MRPII. It would appear that human and organizational issues played a crucial part in
the decision-making process to develop a bespoke software system. The decision by
Company V to develop its own software was seen as a significant turnaround by many
within the organization, and indeed it contradicted the managing director’s initial
justification for purchasing vendor software.
The majority of benefits originally envisaged as deliverables from implementing
vendor software, such as those that were identified in Tables 1 through 3, appeared to
have still remained relevant. However, the scope of costs associated with developing
a bespoke MRPII system was considered greater than originally detailed. Therefore,
as part of a revised CBA, Company V significantly increased its estimate of the costs
it perceived would be incurred during the development, implementation, and opera-
tion of bespoke MRPII software. These new costs were in addition to the already
realized direct costs that had been incurred during the earlier purchase of vendor
software and complement those social subsystem costs reported by Ryan and Harrison
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[19]. Tables 4 and 5 identify the taxonomy of costs that have been classified as indi-
rect organizational and human costs, respectively.
Acknowledging failure through loss of confidence and user participation, Com-
pany V decided to abandon the use of the vendor SFDC module due to the disappoint-
ing results obtained. This decision was made because of:
• poor data reliability
• swipe hardware terminal problems
• lack of employee support and discipline to consistently use the bar code system
• lack of interest in continuing the implementation process
• misalignment between the strategic direction of the vendor and the organization
• falls in productivity
• lack of clear project focus, leadership, and deliverables
Essentially, the company went back to basics and drew on their experiences. It was
decided by the managing director to enlist the support of a consultancy company, as
help was needed to facilitate the design, development, and implementation process.
Before such processes commenced, Company V reassessed its strategic direction, or-
ganizational strengths, and weaknesses, and revised its business plan and developed a
project strategy. Company V then began a series of intensive strategic education ses-
sions and workshop training days. All functional managers were educated on the im-
portance of MRPII, and on the impact that the investment would make to their job
function(s). A simplified course was also developed for shop floor stakeholders. This
course not only addressed the educational issues associated with MRPII but also looked
at the practical implications of such a system on their job function(s). In doing so, it
clearly differentiated education from training. The subject and teaching media used
varied, using as much imagination as possible. Teamwork was promoted, with all
employees being mixed and grouped together. They were filmed and reviewed play-
ing games, using Legos® and jigsaw puzzles, all with meaning for throughput produc-
tion flow, communication, Just in Time (JIT) inventory management, and Total Quality
Management (TQM). The workshop exercises appeared to be well received, and helped
to win over skeptics. In parallel with the workshop training and education sessions, an
information system design and development team was assembled.
Where necessary, employees (subject to their acceptance) were sent on external
training courses to develop new technical skills. In addition, students on industrial
placements were temporarily employed to develop software.  Students were placed at
Company V for a period of six months or one year. During their placement each
student was supervised by a member of staff from a university (implicitly resulting in
technical academic support). This recruitment policy helped to keep system develop-
ment costs down, thus reducing the need for expensive contract engineers. An addi-
tional benefit of having students on the project was to maintain a constant stream of
innovation, inspiration, and motivation. However, closer supervision was needed to
retain project focus than would have been needed if only general company employ-
ees performed the work. During the development of their bespoke IS, Company V
schematically mapped out their entire business process using flowchart tools. In do-
THE PROPAGATION OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT TAXONOMIES     173
ing so, a top-level analysis of Company V’s key business processes was performed,
identifying processes and their order of occurrence.
This enabled processes to be reengineered and facilitated the removal of non–value-
adding activities before any systems were computerized. This approach to reengineering
Table 4. Taxonomy of Indirect Human Costs
Classification of
Indirect Human Costs MRPII  Cost Factors
Management/Staff Resource Integrating computerized production planning
and control into work practices.
Management Time Devising, approving and amending IT and
manufacturing strategies.
Cost of ownership: System Support Vendor support/trouble shooting costs.
Management Effort and Dedication Exploring the potential of the system.
Linking and integrating new systems together,
e.g., CAM, DNC, CIM.
Employee Time Detailing, approving and amending the
computerization of product BOMs.
Employee Training Being trained to manipulate vendor software
and training others.
Employee Motivation Interest in computerized production planning
and control reduces as time passes.
Changes in Salaries Pay increases based on improved employee
flexibility.
Software Disposal The removal of all software prior to disposal.
Staff Turnover Increases in interview costs, induction costs,
training costs based in the need for skilled
human resource.
Table 5. Taxonomy of Indirect Organizational Costs
Classification of Indirect
Organizational Costs MRPII Cost Factor
Productivity Losses Developing and adapting to new systems,
procedures, and guidelines.
Strains on Resource Maximizing the potential of the new
technology through integrating information
flows and increasing information availability.
Business Process Reengineering The redesign of organizational functions,
processes, and reporting structures.
Hardware Disposal The removal of all hardware prior to
environmentally friendly disposal.
Organizational Restructuring Covert resistance to change.
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was considerably different from earlier attempts in that previous processes appeared to
be generic and were based around the functionality of the vendor-supplied software.
The reengineering of business processes before bespoke system development allowed
for the software being developed to be modeled on best practice jobbing shop activities.
It was at this point that the expertise of the consultancy company and academic institu-
tions proved invaluable.
Technology Management Factors: Key Learning Issues
AS A RESULT OF THE CASE STUDY FINDINGS, a number of technology management
factors have been identified as having an impact on the failure/success of Company
V’s adoption of MRPII. These factors are presented in Table 6, where their contribu-
tion is identified toward the implementation of vendor software and the later develop-
ment of a bespoke system.
The inability of traditional modes of financial analysis to justify IT/IS investments
(which have strategic implications) has led a growing number of practitioners in call-
ing for a moratorium on their use. The reason for this is that traditional approaches
are considered to offer narrow levels of analysis, through their prescriptive focus on
operational implications of the investment. This is further complicated, with many
managers becoming preoccupied with financial appraisal insofar as practical strate-
gic considerations have been overlooked and in some cases ignored. This inevitably
results in many strategically important projects failing to “pass” the financial justifi-
cation stage of the evaluation process. Consequently, companies are often forced to
adopt a myopic approach to IT/IS project justification. This is further complicated
where the information system is modular and the system is purchased in stages, the
implications being that the appraisal methods only consider the benefits and costs
associated with the module being evaluated and are unable to account for benefits
that the entire system brings.
Conclusions
THE INCREASED SCOPE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY has not only provided organizations
with enablers for change but also prompted companies to reassess the way they evalu-
ate, manage, and exploit technology. The empirical results reported in this paper have
identified a case where traditional modes of investment appraisal were inappropriate
when accounting for the implications of the investment, and as a result, did not sup-
port the efficient and effective deployment of new technology. Therefore, the strategy
adopted by the case study when evaluating the MRPII investment was an “act of
faith,” and thus ad hoc in nature. This subsequently resulted in the system being con-
sidered a “failure,” as human and organizational factors were neglected during the
evaluation and technology management process. The main reason for Company V’s
ad hoc approach to investment decision-making was that many of the benefits result-
ing from their investment were considered intangible and nonfinancial. Consequently,
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Table 6. Comparative Review of Technology Management Processes
Technology Management
Factors Vendor Software Bespoke Software
Investment Strategy Act of Faith Educated Decision Without
Financial Quantitative
Analysis
Formal Project Management No Yes
Company Culture Closed Open
Concept Justification to No Yes
  Workforce
Workforce Educated/Trained No Yes
Management Educated/Trained No Yes
Appraisal Technique Cost/Benefit Analysis Cost/Benefit Analysis
Consultancy Support No Yes
Academic Involvement No Industrial Placement
of Students
Continuous Project Evaluation No Monthly Management
Review Meetings
Investment Integrated No Yes
  in Business Plan
Classification of Benefits Strategic, Tactical, Strategic, Tactical,
and Operational and Operational
Nature of Benefits Identified Financial, Non- Financial, Nonfinancial,
financial, and Intangible
and Intangible
Classification of Costs Identified Direct Costs Direct and Indirect Costs
Nature of Costs Identified Financial Financial and Intangible
Risk Considered Competitive Risk Competitive Risk
Implementation Process Implementation Team Implementation Team with
Contribution from Other
Functions
Project Leader Managing Director Production Director
Development Scope Short/Medium Term Long Term
Human Factors Not Considered Addressed Where Possible
Organizational Implications Not Considered and Acknowledged as Being
Not Considered Far-Reaching
Far-Reaching
Implementation Documentation Ad hoc Formal Documentation
Process
Stakeholder Analysis No Yes
Perceived Project Outcome Failure Success
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they could not be accommodated within traditional evaluation and management frame-
works, which had been previously used for the justification of capital manufacturing
equipment. The relatively new and inexperienced management team further compli-
cated the justification process, as a result of their lack of knowledge on how to iden-
tify and manage IT/IS-related benefits and costs. There are also serious implications
connected with the poor project management, which in part was exacerbated by inde-
cisive and inconsistent leadership, thus questioning the appropriate positioning of
project managers within the organizational structure. With management under in-
creasing pressure to produce short-term financial savings through improved produc-
tivity, managers need to ensure that those projects with long-term strategic focuses
were not excluded on the basis of their intangible and nonfinancial benefits. The case
study points to the significance of human and organizational factors, and exemplifies
the need to take account of such issues within any robust evaluation criteria, thus
heightening the significance of the proposed technology management taxonomies.
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NOTE
1. The previously formed software selection and implementation team took the initiative to
implement bespoke MRPII development. They perceived that the company would be more
satisfied with the results of their “own” system, rather than the implementation of “rigid”
vendor software.
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